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MATHIS v. UNITED STATES, 391 U.S. 1 (1968) 
convict him of knowingly filing false tax returns. The 
comt of appeals affinned the conviction. 
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Pursuant to its 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona, 348 U.S. 436 (1966), 
the Court held that when an individual is in govern-
1nent custody and interrogated on n1atters that n1ay 
incriminate hhn, he inust be warned beforehand of his 
right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Any 
information obtained, absent these wa111ll1gs, must be 
excluded from trial. The Court's decision therefore 
extended the Miranda warning require1nent in tWo in1-
portant ways. First, it was made clear that tax inves-
tigations ,of people in government custody necessitate 
a Mirancfa waining. Under the Court analysis, since 
tax investigations are often made in conte1nplation of 
a criminal prosecution, the person under investigation 
needs to be warned of his or her rights. Second, the 
Court's decision 1nade it clear that a Miranda warning 
is required to be given to a person in custody even 
when, as here, the investigation is unconnected to the 
reason why the person is in custody. 
MARCEL GREEN 
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MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN 
STANDARD IN FREE SPEECH CASES 
The public concern standard has operated primarily 
ll1 two categories of free-speech cases: those involving 
speech by government employees and those involv-
ing defamation. In both, the public concern standard 
limits the constitutional protection of speech. The 
Supreme Court has held that government employee 
speech must relate to a matter of public concern to be 
protected from retaliation by employers (Pickering v. 
Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 1968). 
If speech meets this threshold test of public con-
cern, a balancing test is applied. If the interests of the 
employer in providing efficient government outweigh 
the employee's speech interests, the employer can 
discipline the employee based on the speech. In defa-
1nation cases, the Court held in Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985), that the 
First Amendment is not implicated when the plaintiff 
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claiming defamation is not a public figure and the 
allegedly defamatory speech does not relate to a mat-
ter of public concern. Accordingly, the plaintiff 
need not prove actual 1nalice to obtain da1nages 
under state law. 
Determining when speech is a matter of public 
concern has not proved to be an easy task. Jn Connick 
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the Court indicated 
that 1natters of public concern are those of "political, 
social or other concern to the community." The con-
tent, form, and context of the speech will determi11e 
whether it is protected, with content the most impor-
tant factor. The manner, time, and place of delivery 
are enco1npassed within this test. The speaker's 
motive alone does not deterrnll1e whether speech is 
protected, but may be a relevant factor. 
The standard has been applied most frequently in 
employee speech cases. In Connick, the Court con-
cluded that speech that relates to an employee's per-
sonal grievance does not rise to the level of public 
concern, even if it raises questions about the efficient 
functioning of the government, for every employee 
complaint is not a constitutional 1natter. But in Ran.-
kin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), the employee's 
statement to a coworker about the attempted assassi-
nation of President Reagan that "if they go for him 
again, I hope they get him" met the threshold. The 
Court noted that the statement was in the context of 
a discussion on the president's policies and just after 
the attempt on his life. Additionally, the Comt indi-
cated in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School 
District, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), that discrimination is 
inherently a matter of public concern. 
In the October 2005 term, in Garcetti v. Ceballos 
(361 F.3d. 1168, 9th Cir. 2004, cert. granted, 125 S. 
Ct. 1395, 2005), the Court considered whether an 
employee's speech in the course of his job duties is 
protected when it deals with a matter of public con-
cern. The employer is arguing that such speech is 
not protected; instead, the protection only inheres in 
citizen speech by a government employee. If this ar-
gument prevails, some employee speech designed to 
bring governmental wrongdoing to public light will 
lose protection. Regardless of the outcome, the deci-
sion in this case will provide further guidance to the 
lower courts, employers, and employees in determin-
ing what is protected employee speech and it may 
modify the public concern requirement in government 
employee speech cases. 
ANN c. HODGES 
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McCARRAN-W ALTER ACT OF 1952 
The McCarran-Walter Act, formally known as the 
Immigration and Nationality of Act of 1952, was a 
comprehensive reworking of the nation's hn1nigration 
laws. Passed at the height of the cold war, the law 
reflected anxiety about the large numbers of refugees 
from southern and eastern Europe who entered the 
United States following World War II and their 
possible connection to Soviet Con1munis1n. It also 
ren1oved 1nany of the racial exclusions, prin1arily af-
fecting Asians, of earlier innnigration laws. The act 
prohibited immigration of any person found to be a 
1nen1ber of a subversive organization by the attorney 
general and allowed for the deportation of resident 
aliens who were, or had been, members of co1nmunist 
and "con1munist-front" organizations. 
The McCarran-Walter Act built upon earlier pro-
hibitions regarding radical aliens. U.S. inunigration 
law had prohibited admission of anarchists since 
1903, and the Smith Act of 1940 had allowed for 
exclusion of members of organizations advocating 
the violent overthrow of the government. The act 
specifically allowed for the admission of a fonnerly 
communist alien if that individual had been actively 
opposed to Co=unism for at least five years or 
had joined the Communist Party under threat or 
co1npulsion. 
The McCarran-Walter Act provided for greater 
ad1ninistrative discretion in exclusions and deporta-
tions and curtailed federal courts' ability to review 
immigration decisions. All grounds for deportation 
were n1ade retroactive, and noncitizens might be 
McCARTHY, JOSEPH (1908-1957) 
deported for acts that were legal at the time com-
mitted. These provisions caused President Harry 
Truman to veto the act, stating that its lack of ade-
quate judicial safeguards departed from the tradition-
al A1nerican insistence on established standards of 
guilt. Congress overwhelmingly overrode his veto, 
and the McCarran-Walter Act set A1nerica's ll11111i-
gration standards until 1965. 
The act also provided for the denial of a visa of any 
person who advocated Connnunism or the violent 
overthrow of the U.S. government, while allowing 
for a waiver under the attorney general's authority. 
This section was used to exclude a number of foreign 
intellectuals from touring the United States and 
speaking or teaching at universities. It was upheld by 
the Supreme Court in Kleindienst I'. Mandel, 408 U.S. 
753 (1972), but was limited by amendments in 1977 
and repealed in 1990, though restrictions re1nained on 
travel from Cuba. A similar provision, allowing the 
govern1nent to deny visas to those advocating or pub-
licly endorsing terrorist activity, was enacted in the 
USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. 
DANIEL LEVIN 
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McCARTHY, JOSEPH (1908-1957) 
A United States senator from Wisconsin, Joseph 
McCarthy from 1950 to 1954 led a campaign against 
co1111nunists in govern1nent that was routinely dis-
dainful of civil liberties. He was so ruthless apd effec-
tive that the term "McCarthyism" was app!led to all 
of his era's red-baiting and, more abstractly, to out-
bursts in later eras of rabid political labeling employ-
ing innuendo, assigning guilt by association, and lying 
shamelessly. 
McCarthy was born in Grand Chute, Wisconsin, 
the son of devout Catholics who were struggling farm-
ers. He received his early education in a one-room 
schoolhouse and quit school at fourteen. However, 
after unsuccessful ventures as a grocer and chicken 
farmer, he returned to school at the age of twenty and 
managed to complete four years of high school in only 
one year. He then enrolled at Marquette University in 
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